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MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
EILEEN P. RYAN* AND SARAH B. BERSON** 
This article explores the issue of mental illness and the death penalty, a 
timely topic given two recent Supreme Court death penalty decisions: Atkins v. 
Virginia1 and Roper v. Simmons.2  We discuss some of the pitfalls inherent in 
attempts to exempt the mentally ill from the death penalty, and explain why we 
think that narrowing any exemption to the psychotic mentally ill makes the 
most sense from a practical, as well as medical/psychiatric perspective. 
Despite huge strides in our understanding of and ability to treat mental 
disorders in the past thirty years, the general public remains ambivalent and 
uninformed about many aspects of mental illness and the mentally ill.3  
Perhaps nowhere is this more evident and worrisome than in society’s beliefs 
and attitudes toward mentally ill criminals, particularly those who commit 
crimes of violence against others.  The significance of this lack of 
understanding has increased in recent decades; the relationship between mental 
illness and capital punishment has become more intimate and complicated as 
the Supreme Court has woven the use of psychiatry and psychology into its 
death penalty jurisprudence.4 
This relationship is complicated by the fact that psychiatry, like all medical 
specialties, changes as new theories are generated and older theories are 
refined or rejected in light of new information.  National consensus and public 
opinion also change over time, of course.  The Court acknowledges that 
national consensus is important, as are changes in it, by including it as a factor 
 
* Associate Professor of Psychiatric Medicine, University of Virginia Health System, 
Charlottesville, Virginia.  Medical Director, Institute of Law, Psychiatry & Public Policy.  D.O. 
Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine (1984), B.A. New York University (1975). 
** J.D. expected June 2008, University of Virginia School of Law; B.A., 2003, Franklin & 
Marshall College. 
 1. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 3. See Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Still Stuck in the Cuckoo’s Nest: Why do Courts Continue to 
Rely on Antiquated Mental Illness Research?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 987, 987-90 (2002). 
 4. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-21 (holding that the application of the death penalty to the 
mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 
(1986) (The Court had to decide was “whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of 
the insane.”). 
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in its decisions in several death penalty cases.5  Public opinion, however, is not 
a substitute for scientific knowledge.  Scientific opinion changes, as does 
public opinion, and ought to be factored into decision making the way that 
public opinion is.  However, scientific opinion is not public opinion, and we 
ought not to allow public opinion to be presented as medical knowledge. 
Psychiatrists and psychologists have become increasingly involved in the 
capital sentencing process since the 1970s, when presenting mitigating 
information for juries’ consideration became the right of capital defendants.6  
In 1985, the Supreme Court expanded the role of psychiatric experts in death 
penalty cases7 by setting a minimum standard for capital defendants to have 
access to psychiatric consultation.8  As the role of psychiatry and psychology 
in death penalty law grows and changes, it is important that the science is used 
responsibly and consistently.  This article explores several aspects of the 
relationship between psychiatry and the death penalty.  The topic is 
particularly timely given two recent death penalty decisions from the Supreme 
Court, both of which have the potential to affect the relationship between 
psychiatry and capital punishment: Atkins v. Virginia,9 which dealt with the 
execution of mentally retarded criminals and Roper v. Simmons,10 which dealt 
with the execution of minors. 
By discussing some of the pitfalls inherent in attempts to exempt the 
mentally ill from the death penalty and the bounds of psychiatric knowledge 
and how it ought to be applied, we will argue that any such exemption should 
be narrowed to the psychotic mentally ill. 
 
 5. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 562-68; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-16. 
 6. Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33 N.M. L. REV. 
255, 255 (2003).  Psychiatrists have also rebutted mitigating evidence and testified as to 
aggravating factors in capital sentencing hearings, most typically those involving the “future 
dangerousness” of capital defendants.  The importance of psychiatrists and psychologists 
adhering to professional standards of medical and psychological evaluations and conclusions is 
well illustrated in the aggravating mental health testimony of Dr. James Grigson.  Dr. Grigson, a 
Texas psychiatrist, has frequently testified for the prosecution and opined that defendants, some 
of whom he had never personally examined, were “100 percent” likely to kill again.  These 
conclusions are not medically or scientifically grounded.  Robert Weinstock & Liza H. Gold, 
Ethics in Forensic Psychiatry, in THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PUBLISHING TEXTBOOK OF 
PSYCHIATRY 91, 110 (R.I. Simon & L.H. Gold eds., 2004); Laura Bell, Groups Expel Texas 
Psychiatrist Known for Murder Cases, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 26, 1995 (posted on the 
internet by Canadian Coalition Against the Death Penalty, http://ccadp.org/DrDeath.htm. (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2006)). 
 7. Howard Owens, Criminal Law and Forensic Psychiatry, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 
OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 831, 841 (Richard Rosner ed., 2d ed. 2003) (discussing Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)). 
 8. Ake, 470 U.S. at 74, 77-83. 
 9. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312. 
 10. Roper, 543 U.S. at 555-56. 
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From Furman to Roper 
In 1972, the Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia, held that the death 
penalty was being applied unconstitutionally and put a moratorium on 
executions.11  Of the five-person majority, three argued that it was 
unconstitutional to apply the death penalty in a “capricious and arbitrary” 
manner12 and that in order to comport with the Eighth Amendment, states must 
consider the proportionality of the punishment to the crime and use a 
consistent standard in their application of the death penalty.13  The other two 
justices found that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on 
“cruel and unusual punishment” in all cases, not just those that were 
“arbitrary.”14  After Furman, several states revised their capital sentencing 
laws with an eye on the “arbitrary and capricious” hurdle, making the 
imposition of the death penalty more predictable by assigning a mandatory 
death penalty sentence to all homicides committed under certain specified 
conditions.15  In 1976, 1978, and again in 1982, however, the Court ruled that 
this approach was also unacceptable and that judges and juries tasked with the 
decision to impose the death penalty must consider “the character and 
individual circumstances of a defendant” in the case at issue and must receive 
enough information about both to do so.16 
In 1976, the Supreme Court re-examined Georgia’s death penalty statute, 
revised post-Furman, in Gregg v. Georgia.17  The Supreme Court upheld 
Georgia’s statute, noting that while it did not “narrow the scope of its murder 
provisions,” it, among other things, sufficiently “narrow[ed] the class of 
murderers subject to capital punishment by specifying 10 statutory aggravating 
circumstances,”18 and adequately addressed the problem of arbitrariness noted 
in Furman.19  The Supreme Court also acknowledged that national consensus 
had shifted and there was greater support for the death penalty than in 1972, 
noting that a number of states had adopted new statutes post-Furman and this 
was used as evidence of change in national opinion toward the death penalty.20  
 
 11. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam). 
 12. Id. at 240, 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 308-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 
310-11, 313-14 (White, J., concurring). 
 13. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 312-13 (White, J., concurring). 
 14. Id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 358-60, 369-71 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 15. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 589, 593-94 (1978) (discussing OHIO REV. 
CODE §§ 2929.03-2929.04(B) (1975)); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1976) 
(discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975)). 
 16. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 106, 113-17 (1982); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-09; 
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05. 
 17. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 158, 196-207 (1976). 
 18. Id. at 196-97, 207. 
 19. Id. at 198, 206-07. 
 20. Id. at 179-81. 
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The properties of the Georgia statute itself that met the standard of non-
arbitrariness were (a) changes in the scope of certain requirements which made 
the statute sufficiently narrow to ensure that it served the dual purposes of 
deterrence and retributivism by regarding the types and circumstances of 
crimes that led to consideration for the death penalty;21 and (b) required judges 
and juries to consider the nature of the defendant and the circumstances at 
issue when making sentencing decisions and provided them with the 
information to do so.22 
Six years later, in Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court continued to 
gradually increase the constitutional protections for criminals, ruling that in the 
sentencing phase of a capital trial, judges and juries must have the opportunity 
to learn of the defendant’s character and weigh mitigating factors when 
deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty.23  Such potentially 
mitigating factors include a defendant’s history of adverse circumstances 
during childhood, such as coming from a broken home and experiencing 
childhood abuse, as well as the defendant’s history of mental illness.24  
Developing mitigation in capital cases typically requires expert witnesses 
(psychiatrists or psychologists) to assist in gathering and interpreting 
information regarding the defendant’s mental health history, such as damaging 
psychological effects of abuse, and often testifying as to how such factors 
came to shape the defendant.25 
In 1986, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ford v. Wainwright prohibited the 
execution of the most gravely mentally ill criminals—those so severely 
mentally ill that they did not meet the very low bar of competence to death.26  
The Ford majority again considered the applicability of changes in the nation’s 
opinion of the death penalty, noting that the “evolving standards of decency” 
ought to be considered.27  While the majority opinion did not provide a 
definition of “competence,”28 Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, 
narrowed the category of the “gravely mentally ill” to “[only] those who are 
unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer 
 
 21. Id. at 196-98. 
 22. Id. at 197-98. 
 23. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-17 (1982). 
 24. Id. at 107-08. 
 25. Gregory B. Leong et al., The Death Penalty, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF FORENSIC 
PSYCHIATRY 81 (Richard Rosner ed., 2d ed. 2003). 
 26. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 104, 401, 417-18 (1986). 
 27. Id. at 406 (noting that the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society” should be included in Eighth Amendment considerations (quoting Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).  “Moreover, the Eighth Amendment’s 
proscriptions are not limited to those practices condemned by the common law in 1789.” Id. 
(referring to Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). 
 28. See id. at 401-18. 
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it.”29  This recommendation would essentially limit the prohibition to those 
prisoners who are psychotic. 
In addition to not defining “competent,” the Supreme Court did not specify 
standards or procedures for evaluations and determinations of mental illness, 
an omission that has contributed to the diversity of death penalty statutes and 
the disparate degrees of protection they afford the mentally ill.30 
Atkins and Roper 
In 1989, the Supreme Court held that mild mental retardation did not 
provide an exemption from the death penalty.31  At the time of that ruling, only 
two death penalty states banned the execution of the mentally retarded, and the 
Court did not consider this “sufficient evidence . . . of a national consensus” 
that executing the mentally retarded would constitute “cruel and unusual 
punishment” under the Eighth Amendment.32  By 2002, however, when the 
Supreme Court issued the Atkins decision, eighteen of the thirty-eight states 
that allowed capital punishment had banned the execution of the mentally 
retarded.33  The Court interpreted this as evidence that national consensus had 
evolved to the point where imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded 
defendants did constitute “cruel and unusual punishment,” thus violating the 
Eighth Amendment.34 
Also in 1989, the Court addressed juvenile eligibility for execution.  In the 
Court’s five-to-four decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, it noted contemporary 
standards of decency, but opined that the execution of a juvenile over the age 
of fifteen, but under age the age of eighteen, did not violate the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.35  At the time, twenty-two of the thirty-seven death 
penalty states allowed the execution of 16-year-olds, and twenty-five states 
permitted it for 17-year-olds.36  In 2005, the Supreme Court held by a five-to-
four vote that the execution of juveniles was excessive and that juveniles were 
exempt from the death penalty.37  The majority again took note of the changes 
in national standards since it issued its ruling in Stanford, by referring to 
 
 29. Id. at 422 (Powell, J, concurring). 
 30. Amnesty International, United States of America: The Execution of Mentally Ill 
Offenders, AI Index: AMR 51/003/2006 (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://web.amnesty.org/ 
library.Index/ENGRAMR510032006. 
 31. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 307-08, 340 (1989). 
 32. Id. at 334-35; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314 (2002) (citing Penry, 492 
U.S. at 334). 
 33. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 314-15 (opinion of the 
Court). 
 34. Id. at 316, 321. 
 35. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369-77 (1989) (opinion of the Court, Scalia, J.); 
id.at 380-81 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 36. Id. at 370. 
 37. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005). 
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Atkins, on which Simmons based his petition, and revisiting the concept of 
“evolving standards of decency.”38 
The decisions in Atkins and Roper raised hopes in some circles that the 
same principles (evolving standards of decency and national consensus) cited 
by the Supreme Court could be equally persuasive in arguing for exempting 
the severely mentally ill from the death penalty.  However, psychiatry and 
psychology must be wary of an already fickle legal system that often distorts 
the use of psychiatric disorders and diagnosis and psychiatric and 
psychological testimony.  One example of how courts and legislators can 
distort the use of psychiatric diagnosis and its meaning are sexually violent 
predator (SVP) laws.39  In upholding the State of Washington’s Community 
Protection Act, the Supreme Court essentially allowed states to define mental 
illness however they wanted.40  Although Atkins dealt with the execution of the 
mentally retarded, not the mentally ill, the majority opinion illustrates some of 
the hazards of using psychology and psychiatric “diagnosis” to justify an 
opinion that has some clear medical and scientific lacunae regardless of any 
moral justification. 
The Trouble With Atkins 
Daryl Atkins “was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital 
murder [of an airman committed when he was age 18,] and [he was] sentenced 
to death.”41  Both Atkins and his accomplice claimed that the other had 
actually killed the victim, but apparently his accomplice presented a more 
“coherent” version of events and he was offered a plea bargain (to first degree 
murder, rather than capital murder) in exchange for his testimony against 
Atkins.42  Atkin’s history was littered with academic failure dating back to 
elementary school and concluding with his failure to finish high school.43  The 
defense psychologist administered intelligence tests, in which Atkins obtained 
a Full Scale IQ of fifty-nine (well into the mildly mentally retarded range) and 
also, as is the standard in forensic evaluations, sought additional information 
 
 38. Id. at 560-68. 
 39. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 253-56 (2001) (discussing Washington’s 
Community Protection Act of 1990 and an instance in which the act was used against someone).  
See Davoli, supra note 3, at 989. 
 40. Washington State’s Community Protection Act of 1990 defines a sexually violent 
predator as one “who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence and who 
suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to 
engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility.” WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 71.09.020 (West 2002). 
 41. Atkins v. Virgina, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002); Donna St. George, A Question of 
Culpability, WASH. POST, July 23, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wpdyn/content/article/2005/07/22/AR2005072202101_pf.html. 
 42. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307 n.1. 
 43. St. George, supra note 41, at A01. 
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regarding the defendant from others who knew him over the years. 44  Another 
psychologist, retained by the prosecution, did not perform intelligence testing 
and did not obtain collateral information;45 however, he testified that Atkins 
was of “at least average intelligence.”46 
Atkins also had a prior criminal history, which included convictions for 
assault, a fact that was not lost on the two juries that voted for the death 
penalty.47  In Atkins the Court held by a six-to-three majority that the execution 
of mentally retarded individuals violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel 
and unusual punishment. 48  The decision was based on two major factors: 
1. the Court’s determination that a “national consensus” had developed 
that the mentally retarded should not be executed,49 and 
 
 44. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308–09. 
 45. An often overlooked complication in our adversarial system, which often relies on expert 
witnesses to help inform the courts, is that some experts approach their forensic evaluations with 
clear biases that they do little to control, and some just perform substandard evaluations for a host 
of other reasons (incompetence, inadequate time or compensation, a desire to “please” the 
retaining attorney, etc.). Hon. Earl J. Waits, Evaluating Psychiatric Disorders: A View From the 
Bench, 2 Ann.2003 ATLA-CLE 2583 (2003) (“Both the clinical and forensic fields produce 
occupational bias, though of a different nature.”). 
 46. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.6.  Virginia Supreme Court Justices Hassell and Koontz 
dissented from the affirmation of imposition of the death penalty for Atkins in 2000, rejecting the 
prosecution’s opinion that Atkins was of at least average intelligence as “incredulous as a matter 
of law.”  Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E. 2d 312, 323 (Va. 2000) (Hassell & Koontz, JJ., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev’d, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 47. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308-09; St. George, supra note 41.  In the months leading up to 
murder of the airman, Atkins, who also used marijuana and crack cocaine, had been involved in a 
string of robberies, and had shot one female victim in the abdomen.  The first jury voted for a 
death sentence on Feb. 14, 1998, but the sentence was overturned on appeal when the Virginia 
Supreme Court ruled that the jurors had been given an improper verdict form.  The second jury 
also voted for death on Aug. 19, 1999. St. George, supra note 41.  
On August 5, 2005 after deliberating for thirteen hours a jury in York, Virginia determined 
that Daryl Atkins was not mentally retarded.  The Supreme Court never ruled on whether Atkins 
was mentally retarded, so the issue of whether or not Atkins is retarded was revisited in 2005.  
The prosecution psychologist testified that Atkins showed no signs of intellectual disability when 
interviewed, providing as examples the fact that Atkins told him he was good at algebra (even 
though he had failed math at school), and correctly answered “Michelango” and “Einstein” when 
asked who painted the Sistine Chapel and who is associated with the theory of relativity.  Atkins 
had previously received IQ scores ranging from fifty-nine to seventy-six, but had never been 
tested prior to age eighteen. Dave Reynolds, Jury Says Atkins Does Not Have Mental 
Retardation; Judge Sets Execution Date, Inclusion Daily Express, Aug. 5, 2005, available at 
http://www.inclusiondaily.com/archives/ 05/08/05/080504vaatkins.htm. 
 48. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
 49. Id. at 313-16. 
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2. that mentally retarded individuals who kill are less culpable and less 
likely to be deterred by the death penalty than the “average 
murderer.”50 
The question must be asked: What or who is the “average murderer?” 51  
There is no data or research to guide one in this area.  Is the “average 
murderer” the individual who kills impulsively with minimal forethought in 
the commission of another crime, or is it the murderer who kills in the context 
of some interpersonal conflict?  The “average murderer” even without the 
complication of mental illness would not meet the accepted threshold for 
meriting the death penalty, which has been reserved for the “worst” killers.52  
In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens stated that “pursuant to our narrowing 
jurisprudence, which seeks to ensure that only the most deserving of execution 
are put to death, an exclusion for the mentally retarded is appropriate.”53  This 
raises the question as to what is and/or should be the critical factor(s) 
contributing to “narrowing jurisprudence?”  In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Rehnquist dismissed the Court’s reliance on “international opinion, the views 
of professional and religious organizations, and opinion polls . . . .”54  Justice 
Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, observed that “[s]eldom has an opinion of this 
Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its 
Members.”55  Death penalty opponents and scholars frequently point to public 
opinion polls that indicate that the public is opposed to executing the mentally 
ill.56  However, the public’s idea of what constitutes “mentally-ill-enough” to 
avoid execution is no clearer than what “mentally-retarded-enough” meant in 
public opinion polls that were quoted in the Atkins decision.57  Whether or not 
Atkins is acceptable from a legal perspective, its reasoning is deeply flawed 
from a medical and scientific perspective.  Specifically, the way the decision 
used psychiatric diagnosis, has opened the door to considering whether other 
groups, including the mentally ill, are worthy of such categorical exemption 
from the death penalty.58  Co-opting psychiatry to provide assistance and 
 
 50. Id. at 318-21. 
 51. Id. at 319. 
 52. Charles Lane, Changing Attitudes About the Death Penalty, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 2, 
2006, at A11; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (“cannot with reliability be 
classified among the worst offenders”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (“If the culpability of the average 
murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction . . . the lesser culpability of the 
mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution. . . . [O]ur narrowing 
jurisprudence . . . seeks to ensure that only the most deserving of execution are put to 
death . . . .”). 
 53. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
 54. Id. at 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. at 328-37 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 57. See id. at 325-37. 
 58. Mossman, supra note 6, at 278. 
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testimony that is not medically or scientifically supported is dangerous for both 
the legal and medical professions.  Regardless of one’s personal beliefs about 
the death penalty, an examination of the reasoning and use of psychological 
research and findings in Atkins highlights potential pitfalls in crafting an overly 
broad exemption from execution for mental illness.59 
Legal Arguments Against Imposing the Death Penalty on the Mentally Ill 
Christopher Slobogin has articulated several legal arguments against the 
imposition of the death penalty on the mentally ill.  The “Equal Protection 
Argument”60 states that given current prohibitions against executing juveniles 
and the mentally retarded, there is no rational basis for treating the mentally ill 
differently, and this differential treatment violates the Fourteenth Amendment 
requirement of equal protection under the law.  The “Due Process Argument”61 
states that consideration of mental illness as an aggravating factor in the 
sentencing phase is a due process violation, as it is contrary to law in every 
death penalty state, where it is stated that mental illness should be considered 
as a mitigating factor.62  Slobogin’s third argument against the death penalty is 
the “Eighth Amendment Argument.”63  Here, he contends that the major 
functions of the death penalty, retribution and deterrence, are not carried out, 
because many severely mentally ill offenders are so impaired that they are 
unable to fully appreciate the significance of their sentence.64  However, this 
lack of appreciation for the significance of their sentences would apply only to 
the most floridly psychotic of death row prisoners unless the words “fully” and 
“significance” were defined more stringently.65 
“Death Is Different” and The Problem of Using Mental illness in the 
Incremental Abolition of the Death Penalty 
Because the death penalty is “qualitatively different” from all other 
punishments, it requires special procedural protection against error.66  The 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 1 CALIF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 
¶¶ 6-15 (2000), available at http://www.boalt.org/bjcl/vl/vlslobogin.htm. 
 61. Id. at ¶¶ 16-28 
 62. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). 
 63. Slobogin, supra note 60, at ¶¶ 29-38. 
 64. Id. at ¶¶ 29-36. 
 65. Id. at ¶¶ 32-33. 
 66. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“[T]he Eighth Amendment requires States to apply special procedural safeguards when they seek 
the death penalty.” (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976))); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating the majority’s holding that it is cruel and unusual 
punishment to execute the mental retarded is the “pinnacle of . . . death-is-different 
jurisprudence”); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 463 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 
“the previously unquestioned principle” that unique safeguards are necessary because death is 
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Supreme Court has consistently described two features of the death penalty 
that justify extraordinary procedural safeguards. 67  One is the irreversibility 
and irrevocability of death.68  The other feature is the “enormity” or “severity” 
of this “ultimate” punishment.69  However, there is not unanimity on the 
constitutional basis for the “death-is-different” jurisprudence on the current 
Supreme Court.70  In his dissent in Atkins, Justice Scalia states “[t]here is 
something to be said for popular abolition of the death penalty; there is nothing 
to be said for its incremental abolition by this Court.”71  It is precisely this 
“incremental abolition” that creates dilemmas with respect to the concept of 
mental illness and the death penalty.72  The arguments made in Atkins were 
made again in Roper and similar arguments can be expected in the case that 
ultimately challenges the execution of a mentally ill petitioner, as we will 
discuss in the following sections.73 
Reaction from Professional Organizations to Atkins 
The responses from a variety of professional organizations, including the 
American Psychiatric Association, to Atkins was contradictory to their usual 
stances regarding the use of diagnoses for non-clinical purposes.74 After Atkins 
 
“qualitatively different”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286, 289 (1972) (Brennan J., 
concurring)  (stating “[d]eath is a unique punishment . . . .” and that “[d]eath . . . is in a class by 
itself.”); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that “[t]he penalty of death differs from  all 
other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind”). 
 67. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187. 
 68. Ring, 536 U.S. at 616 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“death is not reversible”); Wainwright, 
469 U.S. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“irrevocability”); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (“There is no 
question that death as a punishment is unique in its . . . irrevocability.”); Furman, 408 U.S. at 290 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“[F]inality of death precludes relief.”); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (Death is “unique in its total irrevocability.”). 
 69. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joint opinion) (death is 
“unique in its severity”); Furman, 408 U.S. at 286, 287, 290 (Brennan, J., concurring) (death is 
the “ultimate sanction[;]” “uniqueness of death is its extreme severity[;]” and “[d]eath is truly an 
awesome punishment”). 
 70. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337-38 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[D]eath-is-
different jurisprudence. . . . [F]ind[s] no support in the text or history of the Eighth 
Amendment . . . . Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the 
personal views of its Members.”). 
 71. Id. at 353. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005) (“As in Atkins, the objective indicia of 
consensus in this case—the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the 
infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward 
abolition of the practice—provide sufficient evidence that today our society views juveniles, in 
the words Atkins used respecting the mentally retarded, as ‘categorically less culpable than the 
average criminal.’” (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316)). 
 74. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS (Text Revision) xxxvii (4th ed., 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR] (“The 
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was announced, Renée Binder, M.D., then Chair of the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Committee on Judicial Action commended the Court’s decision, 
noting that the Court had recognized that “there are objective and reliable 
determinations of whether an individual has mental retardation when the 
assessment is done by qualified professionals with substantial experience.”75 
The amicus brief submitted by the American Psychological Association, 
American Psychiatric Association, and American Academy of Psychiatry and 
the Law, boldly states that “mental retardation can be identified using time-
tested instruments and protocols with proven validity and reliability.”76  
Furthermore, the brief states that psychologists and psychiatrists can make an 
“objective determination” regarding whether a defendant is or is not mentally 
retarded by using established tests of intelligence and adaptive functioning, and 
that examiners “undertaking separate assessments should reach the same 
conclusions.”77  However, there is a significant body of evidence and 
experience that contradicts these assertions.78 
The statement by Marilyn Benoit, M.D., then president of the American 
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (AACAP), also issued after the 
 
purpose of DSM-IV is to provide clear descriptions of diagnostic categories in order to enable 
clinicians and investigators to diagnose, communicate about, study, and treat people with various 
mental disorders. . . . The clinical and scientific considerations involved in categorization of these 
conditions as mental disorders may not be wholly relevant to legal judgments, for example, that 
take into account such issues as individual responsibility, disability determination, and 
competency.”). 
 75. Ken Hausman, Court Bars Execution of Mentally Retarded Criminals, PSYCHIATRIC 
NEWS, July 19, 2002, at 1, available at http://pn.psychiatryonline.org. 
 76. Brief of American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, and the 
American Academy of Psychiatry and Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, 
McCarver v. North Carolina, No. 00-8727 (2001), available at http://www.apa.org/psyclaw/ 
alpha.html [hereinafter Brief of APA].  The Supreme Court was slated to hear the case of a 
mentally retarded inmate. McCarver v. North Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001).  The Court 
dismissed this case when the North Carolina legislature passed a statute barring the execution of 
the mentally retarded. PsycLAW: Atkins v. Virginia, available at http://www.apa.org/psyclaw/ 
atkins-v-va.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2006) [hereinafter PsycLAW]; See also McCarver v. North 
Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001).  The Court then allowed briefs that had already been prepared in 
support of McCarver to be presented in the Atkins appeal. PsycLAW, supra. 
 77. Brief of APA, supra note 76, at 3. 
 78. See generally Tomoe Kanaya et al., The Flynn Effect and U.S. Policies, 58 AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGIST 778 (2003), available at www.apa.org/journals/releases/amp5810778.pdf.  
“Thus, the ‘official’ definitions [of mental retardation] vary slightly, although all of them 
stipulate an IQ of 70 or below as being an important criterion for classification as MR.  However, 
whether a child who meets the IQ score criteria for MR is actually labeled MR can vary 
substantially between school districts and agencies and even between psychologists within an 
agency or a school district.  Part of this variability is due to the ambiguity in the definition of 
limited adaptive skills . . . . Moreover . . . it is possible to be subaverage during one epoch of life 
but not during another.” Id. at 779 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
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Supreme Court’s decision was announced, is perhaps the most telling.79  She 
stated that child psychiatrists (the organization’s members) “know that 
mentally retarded adults often begin as mentally retarded children who don’t 
receive the proper intervention to help them.  The answer to helping these 
offenders is appropriate intervention, not execution.”80  Such a statement 
seems to indicate strong opposition to the death penalty generally. 
With the Atkins decision, the Individual Rights and Responsibilities 
Section of the American Bar Association recognized the opportunity to 
consider the extent to which mental illness should or should not lead to an 
exemption from the death penalty.81  A Task Force consisting of attorneys, 
legal scholars, psychiatrists, and psychologists is in the process of developing a 
proposal to “protect persons with mental illness from the death penalty.”82  If 
the proposals of the Task Force are adopted by the American Bar Association 
(ABA) as they have been articulated in Catholic University’s Columbus 
School of Law’s recent symposium on mental illness and the death penalty, 
they focus on three major resolutions.83 
First, defendants who at the time of their offenses had “significant 
limitations in both their intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior, as 
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills, resulting from 
mental retardation, dementia, or a traumatic brain injury” should not be 
sentenced to death or executed.84  Second, defendants who at the time of their 
offenses “had a severe mental disorder or disability that significantly impaired 
their capacity (a) to appreciate the nature, consequences, or wrongfulness of 
their conduct; (b) to exercise rational judgment in relation to conduct; or (c) to 
conform their conduct to the requirements of the law” should not be sentenced 
to death or executed.85  The recommendation further states that a “disorder 
manifested primarily by repeated criminal conduct or attributable solely to the 
acute effects of voluntary use of alcohol or other drugs does not, standing 
alone, constitute a mental disorder or disability.”86 
The third recommendation focuses on severe mental disorders after 
sentencing and states that the death penalty should not be imposed “if the 
 
 79. Hausman, supra note 75, at 2. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Interview with Richard J. Bonnie, John S. Battle Professor of Law and Director of the 
Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy, University of Virginia (Oct. 13, 2005). 
 82. Editor’s Preface, Symposium: The Death Penalty and Mental Illness, 54 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 1113, 1113 (2005); Ronald J. Tabak, Overview of Task Force Proposal on Mental 
Disability and the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1123, 1123 (2005). 
 83. Recommendations of the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and 
Responsibilities Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 
1115, 1115-16 (2005) [hereinafter Recommendations]. 
 84. Id. at 1115. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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prisoner has a mental disorder or disability that significantly impairs his or her 
capacity (i) to make a rational decision to forgo or terminate post-conviction 
proceedings available to challenge the validity of the conviction or sentence; 
(ii) to assist counsel . . . in relation to specific claims bearing on the validity of 
the conviction or sentence that cannot be fairly resolved without the prisoner’s 
participation; or (iii) to understand the nature and purpose of the punishment,  
or to appreciate the reasons for its imposition in the prisoner’s own case.”87  
The resolution goes on to state recommended procedures for cases involving 
prisoners with severe mental disorders who want to stop or forego post-
conviction proceedings, are unable to assist counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings, or unable to understand the punishment or its purpose.88 
The ABA Task Force resolution notes that in adopting these resolutions, 
the ABA “takes no position on the death penalty” apart from those individuals 
who would be exempted from execution under the above recommendations 
and those related to “existing Association policies” related to mentally retarded 
offenders and those under age eighteen at the time of their offenses.89 
SEMANTICS AND PSYCHIATRY 
The Court has a long-standing regard of psychiatry as an “inexact 
science.”90  The idea undergirding this conception is that the rest of medical 
science is an “exact science.”91  The fact is, however, that much of medicine, 
including psychiatry, is an “inexact science.”92  The idea that psychiatry is 
fundamentally different from the rest of medicine leads all too easily to the 
conclusion that there is little or no science in the field of psychiatry, rendering 
the presence or absence of mental illness nothing more than the matter of one’s 
opinion.  This is reflected in the statutory definition of insanity relied on by 
some states, where an individual may commit criminal acts under the press of 
documented psychosis consisting of hallucinations and/or delusions and fail to 
meet the threshold for “insanity.”93 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1115-16. 
 89. Recommendations, supra note 83, at 1116. 
 90. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 
430 (1979) (The Supreme Court stated that “psychiatric diagnosis . . . [is] based on [subjective] 
medical impressions . . . . This process often makes it very difficult for the expert physician to 
offer definite conclusions about any particular patient.”). 
 91. See James M. Berger, False Memory Syndrome and Therapist Liability to Third Parties 
for Emotional Distress Injuries Arising from Recovered Memory Therapy: A General Prohibition 
on Liability and a Limited Liability Exception, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 795, 813 (2000). 
 92. Davoli, supra note 3, at 993. 
 93. Deborah Giorgi-Guarnieri et al., AAPL Practice Guideline for Forensic Psychiatric 
Evaluation of Defendants Raising the Insanity Defense, 30 J. AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 
S3, S28-S29 (Supp. 2002). 
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Courts perpetuate this conception of psychiatry by relying on obsolete 
psychiatric and psychological theories94 and by using current terminology 
imprecisely.95  By failing to correctly apply current medical knowledge to the 
area of psychiatric disorders, definitions of mental illness in law can be so 
broad as to be meaningless.  Justice Stewart, writing for a unanimous court in 
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 96 asked, “[m]ay the State fence in the harmless 
mentally ill solely to save its citizens from exposure to those whose ways are 
different?”97  He goes on to analogize “harmless mental illness” to being 
“physically unattractive or socially eccentric.”98  In the same case, Justice 
Burger describes the field of psychiatry as “baffling.”99  What is “baffling” is 
the continuing acceptance of mental illness as a nebulous, subjective construct, 
even while such ideas are being rendered increasingly obsolete as research is 
advanced concerning the biological bases of severe mental illnesses. 
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN THE DEFINITION OF “SEVERE MENTAL DISORDER OR 
DISABILITY” OR WHY THE ENEMY OF THE GOOD IS THE PERFECT 
There is very little research on the incidence of severe mental illness in 
death row inmates.100  The American Civil Liberties Union estimates that five 
to ten percent of prisoners on death row have a serious mental illness;101 
however, what meets the threshold for a serious mental illness is never 
defined.102 
 
 94. Davoli, supra note 3, at 991. 
 95. Id. at 995. 
 96. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 564 (1975). 
 97. Id. at 575. 
 98. Id.  What is “harmless mental illness?”  For that matter, what is harmless cardiac disease, 
harmless diabetes, or a harmless seizure disorder?  “Harmless” is not an adjective associated with 
other serious medical illnesses. See Robert Brown, Physical Illness and Mental Health, 7 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 17, 25 (1977). 
 99. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 578 n.2 (Burger, J., concurring).  Further, Justice Burger states, 
“Indeed, there is considerable debate concerning the threshold questions of what constitutes 
‘mental disease’ and ‘treatment.’” (quoting Thomas Szasz, The Right to Health, 57 GEO. L. J. 734 
(1969)). Id. at 584 n.5 Professor Szaz has construed mental illness as a myth. Szasz, supra, at 
740. 
 100. Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Psychiatric, Neurological, and Psychoeducational 
Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States, 143 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 838, 
839-44 (1986) [hereinafter 15 Death Row Inmates].  The authors report that all subjects had a 
history of “severe” head injury, and five subjects had objective signs of neurological impairment. 
Id. at 840.  Six subjects had psychotic symptoms predating incarceration, and two others were 
manic-depressive (bipolar). Id.  While the results are interesting and provocative, the results have 
not been replicated by other investigators using reliable, validated assessment instruments. 
 101. American Civil Liberties Union, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty in the United 
States, Jan. 31, 2005, available at http://www.aclu.org/capital.mentalillness/ 
10617pub20050131.html. 
 102. See id. 
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Any exemption from the death penalty on the basis of severe mental illness 
should adhere to the same principles; that is, meeting a threshold condition 
requiring both a severe mental illness and clear functional impairment.103  
Specifically, the adjective “severe” merits additional consideration and 
clarification.104 
This section examines various disorders and clinical entities that could 
potentially qualify for exemptions from the death penalty under the ABA Task 
Force Recommendations, and discuss the importance of keeping the exemption 
as narrow and focused as possible on the severely mentally ill—specifically 
individuals with psychosis. 
The Axis I psychiatric disorders with psychosis (schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, and major depression with psychotic 
features for example) are more firmly grounded (as opposed to personality 
disorders, and dissociative disorders for example) in the traditional medical 
model of illness.  Although the fundamental pathologic processes associated 
with schizophrenia, major depression, and bipolar disorder have not been fully 
delineated, these brain disorders are related to structural and function brain 
pathology, including imbalances in neurotransmitters in the case of mood 
disorders105 and problems in brain circuitry and neurotransmitters in the case 
of schizophrenia.106  They follow a predictable course and respond to 
organically based treatments such as antidepressant and antipsychotic 
medication and electroconvulsive therapy.107 
Personality disorders, in contrast, describe patterns of emotions, thoughts, 
attitudes, and behaviors that deviate markedly from what is defined as 
“normative.” 108  While it is possible or even likely that there are biological 
 
 103. See, e.g., Ellen Byers, Mentally Ill Criminal Offenders and the Strict Liability Effect: Is 
There Hope for a Just Jurisprudence in an Era of Responsibility/Consequences Talk?, 57 ARK. L. 
REV. 477, 528 (2004-2005). 
 104. Compare Christina E. Newhill and Wynne S. Korr, Practice with People with Severe 
Mental Illness: Rewards, Challenges, Burdens, 29 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 297, 299 (2004) 
(“[W]e defined severe mental illness as “schizophrenia, major mood disorders, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, and severe personality disorders.”) with Robert E. Drake, M.D. et al., The 
History of Community Mental Health Treatment and Rehabilitation for Persons with Severe 
Mental Illness, 39 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 427, 427 (2003) (“The conditions that we 
call severe mental illness – those mental disorders that interrupt, destabilize, and imperil lives for 
years – continue to challenge and preoccupy psychiatry and the other mental health 
professions.”). 
 105. Madhu Kalia, Neurobiological Basis of Depression: An Update, 54 METABOLISM 
CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL 24, 24-25 (Supp. 2005). 
 106. Leisa A. Glantz et al., Apoptic Mechanisms and the Synaptic Pathology of 
Schizophrenia, 81 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 47, 47-48 (2006). 
 107. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Overview of 
Treatment, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, available at 
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/ chapter2/sec6.html. 
 108. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 74, at 686. 
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underpinnings to some severe personality disorders, the internal variability of 
symptom patterns as well as their inconsistent response to treatment suggest 
that they are normatively defined and should not be characterized as 
illnesses.109 
In Atkins, the Court emphasized that execution of the mentally retarded is 
inconsistent with both the retributive and deterrent functions of the death 
penalty.110  The Court noted that individuals with mental retardation have 
“diminished capacities to understand and process information, to 
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage 
in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of 
others.”111  Moral culpability, however, is not completely related to IQ.  The 
impulsive and panicked shooting/murder of a gas station attendant in a botched 
robbery attempt by a mentally retarded individual without a history of repeated 
or predatory violence seems very different from the murder of a victim who 
begged for his life or where torture was involved.  There is really no scientific 
justification to broadly characterize the mildly mentally retarded as being less 
capable of empathy with their fellow human beings.  There is no justification 
for believing that a mildly mentally retarded individual would or should be 
more callous than non-retarded individuals. 
Actively psychotic individuals are typically far more impaired than 
individuals with mild mental retardation in the areas of understanding and 
processing information, logical and rational communication, abstraction, 
logical reasoning, and impulse control.  Delusions and hallucinations typically 
severely compromise the psychotic individual’s ability to appreciate the 
meaning of one’s environment, including the motives and meanings of others’ 
behavior.  Psychosis might cause an individual to believe that her child was 
possessed by the devil and needed to be killed in order to secure his place in 
heaven.  Severe perceptual distortion is not uncommon in schizophrenia, 
whereas it is not an associated feature of mental retardation.112 
Severe Mental Illness with a Psychotic Component 
Whereas psychotic phenomena can be experienced in a variety of 
psychiatric disorders, mental illnesses in which there is persistent 
hallucinations and/or delusions fall into roughly two major categories in the 
DSM-IV-TR—“Schizophrenia and the Other Psychotic Disorders” and “Mood 
Disorders.”113  A discussion of each of these major categories should help 
 
 109. Bruce J. Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental Illness, 1 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 534, 608 (1995). 
 110. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319-20 (2002). 
 111. Id. at 318. 
 112. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 74, at 41-42, 49, 297, 312. 
 113. Id. at 297-98, 410, 413, 415, 416. 
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clarify what it is that renders psychotic individuals (regardless of whether they 
meet the legal threshold for insanity) less culpable for their acts than 
individuals suffering from personality disorders, even if those personality 
disorders are severe.114 
Schizophrenia and the Other Psychotic Disorders 
The DSM-IV-TR includes a number of psychotic disorders grouped 
together in order to facilitate the differential diagnosis of disorders that have 
psychotic symptoms as the predominant or primary aspect of their 
presentation.115  The term “psychotic” in the DSM refers to the presence of 
certain symptoms (hallucinations, delusions, disorganized speech, grossly 
disorganized or catatonic behavior).116  Schizophrenia is the most dominant 
clinical entity among the psychotic disorders and the disorder most easily 
 
 114. In the most recent version available of the ABA-IRR Task Force Recommendations on 
Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, it is recommended that “defendants . . . [who] at the 
time of the[ir] offense . . . had a severe mental disorder or disability that significantly impaired 
their capacity (a) to appreciate the nature, consequences, or wrongfulness of their conduct; (b) to 
exercise rational judgment in relation to conduct; or (c) to conform their conduct to the 
requirements of the laws . . . [should not be executed or sentenced to death].”  Slobogin notes that 
some conditions that are not Axis I disorders “might also, on rare occasions, become ‘severe’ as 
that word is used in [the ABA] recommendation,” specifically noting borderline personality 
disorder. See Christopher Slobogin, Mental Disorder as an Exemption from the Death Penalty: 
The ABA-IRR Task Force Recommendations, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1133, 1139, 1141 (2005) 
[hereinafter Mental Disorder]. 
 115. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 74, at 297. “The disorders [included] in this section 
[Schizophrenia and the Psychotic Disorders] include Schizophrenia, Schizophreniform Disorder, 
Schizoaffective Disorder, Delusional Disorder, Brief Psychotic Disorder, Shared Psychotic 
Disorder, Psychotic Disorder due to a General Medical Condition, Substance-Abuse Induced 
Psychotic Disorder, and Psychotic Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified.” Id. 
 116. Id. at 297-98.  Hallucinations are sensory perceptions that are unrelated to outside 
events—in other words, seeing or hearing things that aren’t there.  A delusion is a false belief and 
the persistent, unshakeable acceptance of the false belief.  The distinction between hallucinations 
and delusions involves content.  In hallucinations, sensory input is improperly processed, whereas 
delusions are ideas or beliefs (complex thoughts) that are abnormal.  Thought disorganization 
refers to compromised ability to engage in goal-directed thinking.  Schizophrenia for example 
often affects a person’s ability to “think straight.”  The person may be unable to connect thoughts 
into logical sequences, and may be unable to sort out what is relevant to the situation.  Their 
thoughts can be disorganized and fragmented and may come and go rapidly, with the person 
being unable to concentrate on one thought for very long and unable to focus.  Thought 
disorganization is typically reflected in disorganized speech and behavior.  Catatonia is 
characterized by stupor associated with either marked rigidity or flexibility of the musculature 
and is associated with a variety of neurological and psychiatric conditions. Id. at 299-300 
(emphasis added). 
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recognized by lay persons as representing psychosis.117  It is important to keep 
in mind however that not all psychosis is schizophrenia.118  “Schizophrenia is a 
[severe mental] illness that can involve [a] massive disruption of thinking, 
perception, emotions and behavior.”119  It has a worldwide lifetime prevalence 
rate of one percent and is a major cause of long-term psychiatric disability.120 
A variety of neuropsychological deficits have been noted in schizophrenia. 
121  The most consistently replicated deficits are in the areas of attention and 
concentration, information processing, learning and memory, and executive 
functions.122  One of the most consistent findings on neuroimaging (CT and 
MRI) has been that of enlarged brain ventricles, although the relationship of 
this finding to the pathophysiology of schizophrenia is uncertain.123  MRI 
studies have also repeatedly shown reduced medial temporal and prefrontal 
lobe124 volumes and progressive structural brain changes occurring from the 
earliest phases of the illness.125 
Schizophrenia is a well recognized severe mental disorder, with a similar 
prevalence in every population in which it has been studied—developed and 
undeveloped nations, in rural and urban area.126 
The symptoms of schizophrenia can be categorized into three broad 
groups: positive, negative, and disorganized.127  It is well known that acutely 
 
 117. EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF PSYCHOSIS: A PRIMER 4 (Mental Health Evaluation & 
Community Consultation Unit), available at http://www.mheccu.ubc.ca/documents/publications/ 
GPprimer.pdf. 
 118. Science Inches Towards an Understanding of the Causes of—and Cures for—Mental 
Illness, 43 INST. OF GOV’T STUDIES PUB. AFF. REP. 12 (2002). 
 119. D. Frank Benson et al., Psychosis, in SYNOPSIS OF NEUROPSYCHIATRY 321 (Barry S. 
Fogel et al., eds., 2000). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Christos Pantelis et al., Structural Brain Imaging Evidence for Multiple Pathological 
Processes at Different Stages of Brain Development in Schizophrenia, 31 SCHIZOPHRENIA 
BULLETIN 672, 672 (2005).  
 122. Benson, supra note 119, at 322-23. Executive functions refer to functions of the frontal 
lobe of the brain that are “important for adapting to [one’s] environment, such as preparation, 
initiation, and modulation of action; . . . abstract reasoning; hypothesis testing, and monitoring of 
ongoing purposeful behavior.” Id. at 323 (emphasis added). 
 123. Id.; see MARVIN I. HERZ & STEPHEN R. MARDER, SCHIZOPHRENIA: COMPREHENSIVE 
TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT 6 (2002). 
 124. HERZ & MARDER, supra note 123, at 9.  The medial temporal lobe of the brain is 
important in the process of sensory information, which may explain some of the highly distorted 
interpretations of the environment (hallucinations and delusions) that individuals with 
schizophrenia experience. Id.  The prefrontal cortex is that area of the brain responsible for some 
of the most complex and highly evolved thought processes in humans, including the regulation of 
working memory and attention (which necessitates the filtering out of extraneous information 
from consciousness). Id.  “The inferior parts of the prefrontal cortex are involved in emotional 
expression.” Id. 
 125. Pantelis et al., supra note 121, at 672. 
 126. HERZ & MARDER, supra note 123, at 3. 
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ill patients with schizophrenia have floridly psychotic symptoms such as 
hallucinations and/or delusions and are severely disorganized in their 
thinking.128  Their functioning is so impaired that they are unable to adequately 
care for themselves.129 
Persistent psychotic symptomatology (hallucinations, delusions, 
disorganized speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior) may be part 
of a variety of other primary psychotic disorders, termed in DSM-IV as 
Psychotic Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified.130  This diagnosis would include 
persistent psychotic symptomatology about which there is inadequate 
information to make a diagnosis or disorders with psychotic symptoms that do 
not meet the criteria for any other specific psychotic disorder.131 
 
 127. Id. at 23.  Positive symptoms include hallucinations and delusions. Id.  Negative 
symptoms include emotional dulling or flattening, decreased thought and speech production, loss 
of the ability to experience pleasure, and decreased ability to initiate goal-directed behavior. Id. at 
23, 25. “Disorganized symptoms include disorganized speech ([reflecting disorganized thinking 
and]thought disorder) . . . and disorganized behavior and attention . . . .” Id. at 23. 
 128. DCFS Web Resource – Schizophrenia, http://dcfswebresource.prairienet.org/resources/ 
schizophrenia.php (last visited Mar. 27, 2006) [hereinafter DCFS Web Resource].  The course of 
the disorder can be divided roughly into three phases. Id.; see also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC 
ASSOCIATION, PRACTICE GUIDELINE FOR THE TREATMENT OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 3 (2d ed. 2004) 
[hereinafter PRACTICE GUIDELINE].  The acute phase, as mentioned above, is the phase with 
floridly psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations, delusions, disorganized thinking and 
behavior, and severely impaired functioning. DCFS Web Resource, supra (emphasis added).  The 
stabilization phase is characterized by a gradual decrease in the intensity of psychotic symptoms. 
Id. This phase may last an average of about 6 months after the onset of an acute episode, and it is 
during this time that the individual is the most prone to relapse. Id. (emphasis added); see also 
PRACTICE GUIDELINE, supra.  In the stable phase symptoms are relatively stable and almost 
always less intense than the acute phase.  DCFS Web Resource, supra (emphasis added); see 
also, PRACTICE GUIDELINE, supra.  Some individuals may have persistent positive or negative 
symptoms. See HERZ & MARDER, supra note 123, at 25. 
 129. DCFS Web Resource, supra note 128.  The standard for and meaning of being unable to 
care for oneself is sometimes debated. Id. Many of the severely mentally ill homeless who live on 
the streets of cities would not be considered candidates to be hospitalized against their wills. See 
Michael Jonathan Grinfeld, Dying for Treatment: Police Shootings Spur Calls for Change, 
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Feb. 2000, at 3, available at http://www.pscyhiatrictimes.com/ 
p000283.html.  However, their ability to “choose” a life on the street is hampered by severe 
mental illness (and often intensified by substance abuse), and they often deteriorate until they 
present a clear danger to themselves or others (typically involving an overt act), at which point 
they are able to be hospitalized involuntarily. Id.  One can easily see how a homeless and severely 
psychotic defendant could be portrayed by the prosecution as making a reasoned “choice” to live 
on the streets, and his or her ability to survive as demonstrating shrewd and rational behavior. Id. 
 130. DSM–IV–TR, supra note 74, at 343. 
 131. Id.  Examples of psychotic disorders in this category that could be argued as qualifying 
for death penalty exemptions might include postpartum psychosis that does not meet criteria for 
major depression with psychotic features and substance-abuse-triggered psychosis that persists. 
Id.  Here again, it is not difficult to see how postpartum psychosis would engender far less 
controversy than a psychotic disorder related to substance abuse even in the face of similar severe 
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Mood Disorders and Psychosis 
In addition to schizophrenia and the other psychotic disorders, a number of 
severe mood disorders may have associated psychotic features.132  These 
include major depression with psychotic features and bipolar disorder (either 
manic or depressed) with psychotic features.133  These disorders are 
distinguished from the primary psychotic disorders discussed above in that in 
these disorders psychotic symptoms are secondary to the primary mood 
disorder.  Most commonly in mood disorders, the hallucinations and/or 
delusions are consistent with the depressive or manic themes.134  Psychotic 
symptoms are more common in mania, appearing in over one-half of manic 
episodes.135 
Problems with Traumatic Brain Injuries and Personality Disorders 
Broadening the definition of what constitutes severe mental illness beyond 
thought disorders and mood disorders with psychotic features opens the door to 
include a variety of disorders that few psychiatrists opine to be “equivalent” to 
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, major depression with psychotic 
features, or bipolar disorder with psychosis with respect to the level of 
impairment in one’s ability to interpret one’s reality and make rational 
decisions. 136  There is far less debate among psychiatrists regarding the role 
that biologically based severe mental illnesses with psychotic features or 
symptoms plays in reducing an individual’s culpability than the role of 
personality and dissociative disorders in lessening culpability.  The reason for 
 
impairments in cognition, judgment, appreciation, and impulse control. Id.  However it could also 
be anticipated that persistent psychosis induced by substance or alcohol abuse or dependence 
would constitute a very rare exemption, and would require the same forensic diagnostic skills as 
the evaluation of any other psychotic disorder. See id. at 342. 
 132. Id. at 699. 
 133. Id. at 349, 382, 412. 
 134. Id. at 412.  For example, an individual suffering from a major depression with psychotic 
features may suffer from nihilistic delusions  (e.g. of world or personal destruction), somatic 
delusions (e.g., that they are being consumed by cancer, or otherwise “rotting away”), delusions 
of deserved punishment (e.g., that they are being punished for some moral transgression or 
personal inadequacy), delusions of poverty (e.g., of being bankrupt), or delusions of guilt (e.g., 
being responsible for the death or illness of a loved one). Id. Manic delusions typically are also 
mood congruent, for example believing that one has special powers or is on a mission from God 
or is the President. Id. at 414.  However, less commonly the psychotic features may have little to 
no relationship to the manic themes, and this presentation appears to be associated with a poorer 
prognosis. Id. 
 135. American Psychiatric Association, Practice Guideline for the Treatment of Patients with 
Bipolar Disorders, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2, 11 (Apr. Supp. 2002), available at 
http://www.psych.org/psych_pract/treatg/pg/prac_guide.cfm. 
 136. “Psychotic features” is diagnostic terminology that indicates psychosis. DSM–IV–TR, 
supra note 74, at 413, 415-16, 827. 
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this is that psychosis is characterized by major alterations in mental function 
and includes severe disturbances in cognitive (thought) and perceptual 
processes (hallucinations, delusions) and/or the inability to distinguish reality 
from fantasy or thoughts (impaired reality testing).137 
Traumatic Brain Injury 
The ABA Task Force Recommendations include Traumatic Brain Injury 
(TBI) as an exemption from execution.138  Unfortunately there is no uniform 
definition of what constitutes TBI.  The Centers for Disease Control (CDC), 
however, estimates that approximately 1,500,000 people incur traumatic brain 
injuries in the United States each year and that about seventy-five percent of 
them experience long-term disability.139  Definitions tend to have variations in 
inclusion criteria and to vary according to specialties.  The problem goes 
beyond multiple definitions; the ground that these definitions attempt to cover 
is too large and in some areas too contentious to be a suitable category for 
exemption.  Here are some examples of the disparate definitions.  Often, the 
term “brain injury” is used synonymously with head injury, which may or may 
not be associated with neurological deficits.140  Traumatic brain injury occurs 
as the result of an external mechanical force applied to the head and 
intracranial contents (most importantly the brain).141  The Centers for Disease 
Control defines142 traumatic brain injury as either: 
1) an occurrence of injury to the head that is documented in a medical 
record with one or more of the following conditions attributed to head 
injury: 
• observed or self-reported decreased level of consciousness (may 
refer to partial or complete loss of consciousness) 
• amnesia (memory loss).  There are different types of amnesia. 
Retrograde amnesia refers to memory loss for events immediately 
preceding the injury.  There can be amnesia for the injury itself.  
Anterograde amnesia relates to memory loss for events that occur 
after a traumatic event 
 
 137. Id. at 827. 
 138. Recommendations, supra note 83, at 1115. 
 139. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2006), http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc (last visited Mar. 
28, 2006). 
 140. Id. at app. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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• skull fracture, objective neurological, or neuropsychological 
abnormality,143 OR 
• diagnosed intracranial lesion (such as a bleed or scar tissue 
visualized on CT or MRI scan) 
 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) definition of TBI, 
however, is far more inclusive. 144  IDEA defines TBI as: 
[A]n acquired injury to the brain caused by an external physical force, 
resulting in total or partial functional disability or psychosocial impairment, or 
both, that adversely affects a child’s educational performance.145  The term 
applies to open or closed head injuries resulting in impairments in one or more 
areas, such as cognition; language; memory; attention; reasoning; abstract 
thinking; judgment; problem-solving; sensory, perceptual, and motor abilities; 
psycho-social behavior; physical functions; information processing; and 
speech.146  The term does not apply to brain injuries that are congenital or 
degenerative, or to brain injuries induced by birth trauma.147 
Despite varying criteria for severe versus mild TBI,  it seems fairly 
consistent across a number of well designed research studies that after 
accounting for premorbid psychopathology, severe but not mild brain injury 
increases the risk for psychiatric pathology.148  There are few studies that 
specifically address the prevalence or severity of clearly defined TBI among 
capital defendants or even inmates on death row.  Many defendants who are 
diagnosed with TBI will have sustained the brain injury during childhood or 
 
 143. Neurological abnormalities are determined from neurological examination performed by 
a physician (not necessarily a neurologist) and documented on physical examination. Id.  Some 
examples include abnormalities of motor or sensory function, or reflexes; speech abnormalities 
such as an inability or difficulty understanding written or spoken language despite normal hearing 
(receptive language), or difficulty initiating or maintaining speech (expressive language). Id.  
Neuropsychological tests (for example the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised, Rey 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test, Lauria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery, and Benton Visual 
Retention Test) are indicators of cerebral integrity that are more sensitive than neurological 
examination and EEG, and sometimes neuroimaging. Id.  In the early stages of dementia, the 
sensitivity of neuropsychological tests is greater than neuroimaging and neurological 
examination. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINE WATCH: PRACTICE GUIDELINE 
FOR THE TREATMENT OF PATIENTS WITH ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE AND OTHER DEMENTIAS OF 
LATE LIFE 2 (2004). 
 144. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7 (c)(12) (2001). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id.; see also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE HEAD INJURY ADMINISTRATORS, 
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY FACTS: CHILDREN AND YOUTH, available at http://www.nashia.org/ 
pdocfiles/children.pdf. 
 148. Agnes H. Whitaker et al., Traumatic and Infectious Brain Injury in Children: Psychiatric 
Sequelae, in CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK 434 
(Melvin Lewis ed., 2002). 
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adolescence.  A hint of the scope of the problems that may surface with the 
inclusion of TBI as an exemption to the death penalty can be found in some 
research, which has not been replicated, looking at the prevalence of a history 
of severe head injury and “sequelae” (which would easily meet the definition 
TBI of unspecified severity) in several death row populations.149  It is not 
difficult to foresee the inevitable widening of the door to allow petitions for 
death penalty exclusion based on claims of traumatic brain injury sustained 
during childhood or later. 
Personality Disorders 
The potential for severe personality disorders to be argued as exclusions 
for the death penalty is perhaps the most problematic of the diagnostic entities 
discussed in this section.  Granted, the ABA Task Force recommends that “a 
disorder manifested primarily by repeated criminal conduct” does not alone 
qualify for exemption from the death penalty according to the proposed 
resolutions.150  However, this stipulation does not narrow the field sufficiently 
when it comes to the area of severe personality disorders.  Antisocial 
personality disorder is the only personality disorder in the DSM-IV-TR that 
would categorically disqualify a defendant or prisoner from the death penalty, 
as it is the only DSM-IV-TR personality disorder characterized by repeated 
criminal conduct. 151 
If the ultimate goal is to chip away at the death penalty itself, it makes 
sense to include severe personality disorders in the narrow definition of mental 
disorders for exemption.  But this is not our goal, and we ought not to cloak 
death opposition in psychiatric medical opinions, which should be based on 
something more.  Although no research on the prevalence of personality 
disorders in death row inmates exists, research on personality pathology among 
 
 149. Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational, and Family 
Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United State, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
584, 584 (1988) [hereinafter 14 Juveniles]; 15 Death Row Inmates, supra note 100, at 838.  In a 
study of adults, the authors report that all subjects had a history of “severe” head injury, although 
by descriptions only eleven subjects sustained any loss of consciousness, the significance of 
which was unclear. 15 Death Row Inmates, supra note 100, at 838, 840-41 & tbl.1.  In another 
study, out of all thirty-seven juveniles awaiting execution at the time of the study, the authors 
studied fourteen in four states. 14 Juveniles, supra, at 584.  Nine had “major neurological 
impairment,” seven had “significant organic dysfunction on neuropsychological testing,” and 
only two had Full Scale IQ test scores above ninety. Id. at 585.  All fourteen subjects, despite 
wide variability in the severity of head trauma sustained as well as the subjective neurological 
symptomatology and objective evidence of neurological dysfunction, may have met the threshold 
for diagnosis of TBI given the authors’ descriptions. Id. at 586 tbls. 1, 2. 
 150. Recommendations, supra note 83, at 1115. 
 151. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 74, at 701.  Antisocial Personality Disorder is characterized 
by a “pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that begins in 
childhood or early adolescence and continues into adulthood.” Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
374 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:351 
the general criminal population indicates a high prevalence of personality 
disorders, which potentially could qualify for exclusion.152  The specific 
feature of personality disorders that capital defendants’ attorneys might apply 
to an argument for exemption is the presence of “psychotic-like symptoms . . . 
during times of stress” at the time of the offense.153 
The DSM-IV-TR indicates that borderline, paranoid, and schizotypal 
personality disorders are characterized by a vulnerability to experience 
transient psychotic symptoms under severe stress.154  Others have noted that 
narcissistic and histrionic personality disorders155 are also prone to these brief 
psychotic interludes, sometimes called “micropsychotic episodes.”156  In 
personality-disordered individuals, micropsychotic episodes may be 
precipitated by drugs or stress.157  The psychotic symptomatology may include 
visual or auditory hallucinations, depersonalization, derealization, and 
paranoid thinking.158  The psychotic symptoms associated with personality 
disorders, unlike the psychotic features associated with Axis I major mental 
disorders, are transient, lasting minutes to hours.159  The associated symptoms 
in borderline personality disorders may include a pattern of unstable and 
intense interpersonal relationships; a markedly and persistently unstable sense 
of self; recurrent suicidal threats or behavior or self injury (such as cutting or 
burning); impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-destructive 
(spending, sex, substance abuse, reckless driving); affective (emotional) 
instability due to markedly reactive mood; and inappropriate and intense anger 
 
 152. Merrill Rotter et al., Personality Disorders in Prison: Aren’t They All Antisocial, 73 
PSYCHIATRIC QUARTERLY 337, 342-43 & tbl.2, 346-47 (2002).  In this study, authors found a 
prevalence of ten percent for personality disorders other than antisocial among prisoners in the 
New York State prison system. Id. at 343, 346.  It is hard to imagine how a personality disorder 
could qualify as grounds for precluding execution after sentencing, given the fact that even a 
severe personality disorder, such as borderline personality disorder, would not qualify as being so 
incapacitating as to preclude a prisoner’s ability to: 1) make a rational decision to forgo or 
terminate post-conviction proceedings, 2) assist counsel, or 3) understand the nature and purpose 
of the death penalty and the reason for its imposition in his or her own case. See 
Recommendations, supra note 83, at 1115.  However, interpersonal volatility including extremes 
of idealization and devaluation of significant others (one’s attorney in this situation would 
certainly qualify) could significantly interfere with the attorney-client relationship and be 
construed as an obstacle to assisting counsel. See id. (stating that “[a] sentence of death should 
not be carried out if the prisoner has a mental disorder or disability that significantly impairs his 
or her capacity . . . to understand or communicate information, or otherwise assist counsel . . . .”). 
 153. Mental Disorder, supra note 114, at 1141. 
 154. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 74, at 692, 698, 708. 
 155. SHAWN CHRISTOPHER SHEA, PSYCHIATRIC INTERVIEWING: THE ART OF 
UNDERSTANDING 333 (2d ed., 1998).  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 332. 
 158. Id. at 333; see also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 74, at 698. 
 159. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 74, at 698-99. 
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or trouble controlling anger (which may include frequent anger outbursts or 
rages, constant anger, and physical fights).160  Borderline personality disorder 
is often associated with a history of childhood abuse and/or neglect beginning 
in early childhood.161 
Psychiatric Diagnosis and Its Relevance 
Courts reinforce their reluctance to appropriately weigh and consider 
relevant psychiatric medical and scientific evidence when they misuse or 
misconstrue psychiatric diagnoses.  The problem stems from an attempt to 
compare apples and oranges – applying diagnosis developed in a clinical or 
treatment setting and then applying it in a forensic setting.  The often baffling 
reluctance of courts to appropriately weigh and consider medical and scientific 
evidence in their opinions regarding issues that bear on the medical specialty 
of psychiatry is only reinforced and abetted by the mixing of apples and 
oranges in the area of psychiatric diagnosis and its relevance to the legal issue 
at hand.  While psychiatric diagnosis is immensely useful in clinical settings, 
where the primary purpose is to determine appropriate treatment, its utility is 
less clear in forensic settings.  When do psychiatric diagnoses clarify and when 
do they obscure the legal issue?  A discussion of an exemption from the death 
penalty for severe mental illness provides a useful backdrop for revisiting this 
issue. 
As previously noted, the DSM-IV-TR provides a caution against the 
forensic use of diagnostic categories found in the DSM.162  This caution is 
sometimes erroneously interpreted to mean that psychiatric diagnoses can 
never be applied to defendants or litigants.  In reality, the caution means that 
clinical diagnoses were not developed for legal purposes and are not the 
equivalent of legal definitions.  For example, schizophrenia is not the medical 
equivalent of legal insanity and PTSD does not translate into either causation 
or compensation.163  A person with pedophilia is not the medical equivalent of 
 
 160. Id. at 710. 
 161. Rebehah Bradley et al., Etiology of Borderline Personality Disorder: Disentangling the 
Contributions of Intercorrelated Antecedents, 193 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 24 (2005). 
 162. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 74, at xxxvii. 
 163. Compare id. at 312 (providing the following with respect to the characteristic symptoms 
of schizophrenia: “Two (or more) of the following, each present for a significant portion of time 
during a 1-month period (or less if successfully treated): (1) delusions; (2) hallucinations; (3) 
disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence); (4) grossly disorganized or 
catatonic behavior; [and] (5) negative symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia, or 
avolition . . . .”) with RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW app. at A-36 (2d ed., 1997) 
(reproducing MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01) (“A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at 
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either 
to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law.”).  Compare DSM-IV-TR, supra note 74, at 467-68 (providing the 
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the legal definition of a sexually violent predator.164  When diagnosis becomes 
a legal determinant for exemption, culpability, or competence, the result may 
confound rather than clarify. 
In the insanity defense, where most codifications make the presence of a 
mental disease or defect an essential element, psychiatric diagnosis is a crucial 
legal element of the defense if a proper foundation exists for the diagnosis.  
However, there are also functional criteria that must be met in the legal 
defense.  Even in situations where psychiatric diagnosis is an essential element 
of a claim or defense (competence to stand trial or insanity), the diagnosis of a 
mental illness in and of itself is insufficient.  For example, one could suffer 
from Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type, Episodic with Interepisode Residual 
Symptoms (the DSM-IV-TR diagnosis) and not meet the legal standard of 
insanity.165  An insanity defense requires that a nexus be established between 
the mental illness and insanity (however insanity is codified within a particular 
jurisdiction). 
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND POTENTIAL PITFALLS 
Mitigation 
Despite the fact that evidence of mental illness should be mitigating 
against the imposition of the death penalty,166 the reality is that it is often 
aggravating.167  For example, a man in Florida was convicted of capital murder 
for killing a cab driver whom he raped while she was dead or dying.168  At the 
sentencing phase, the defendant’s attorney introduced extensive evidence that 
the defendant suffered from schizophrenia and experienced hallucinations and 
 
diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder) with BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 212, 277 
(7th ed. 1999) (providing definitions for both “causation” and “compensation”). 
 164. Compare DSM-IV-TR, supra note 74, at 572 (providing the following diagnostic criteria 
for pedophilia: “(A) Over a period of at least 6 months, recurrent, intense sexually arousing 
fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving sexual activity with a prepubescent child or 
children (generally age 13 years or younger); (B) The person has acted on these sexual urges, or 
the sexual urges or fantasies cause marked distress or interpersonal difficulty; [and] (C) The 
person is at least 16 years and at least 5 years older than the child or children in Criterion A.”) 
with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020 (West 2002) (defining sexually violent predator as 
“any person who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence and who 
suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to 
engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility.”). 
 165. The Art of Forensic Psychology: Insanity, http://www.crimelibrary.com/criminal_mind/ 
forensics/forensic_psychology/6.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). 
 166. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982). 
 167. Ella Fells Berkman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in Capital 
Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 291 (1989); J.L. Judson et al., A Study of the California 
Penalty Jury in First Degree Murder Cases, 21 STAN L. REV. 1297, 1339-40 (1969). 
 168. Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d  882, 883 n.1 (Fla. 1979). 
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delusions that other women were his hated mother.169  Although the Supreme 
Court has held that mental illness should be considered a mitigating factor in 
the decision to impose the death penalty,170 the jury recommended the death 
penalty and the judge imposed it based on the defendant’s propensity to 
commit violent acts.171  The Florida Supreme Court ultimately vacated the 
defendant’s death sentence on the basis that the aggravating circumstances 
stemmed from his mental illness.172  However, it is hard to ignore the reality 
that if juror behavior is considered a proxy measure of public opinion, the 
public is inclined to perceive the vileness of an individual crime and the 
defendant’s future dangerousness as outweighing the mental illness of a 
defendant, regardless of how severe it may be. 
Not Guilty By Reason Of Insanity 
Those few studies that have examined the issue of severely mentally ill 
defendants and the death penalty indicate that defendants who unsuccessfully 
raise an insanity defense are significantly more likely to receive a death 
sentence than defendants who do not plead Not Guilty By Reason Of Insanity 
(NGRI).173  There has been the general assumption in the scant literature 
addressing the issue of mental illness and the death penalty that public 
ignorance and fear accounts for this seemingly illogical association between 
mental illness and harsher punishment.174  There is no research to substantiate 
this hypothesis.  A more provocative, and as of yet also unresearched question  
is whether ignorance and ambivalence about genuine mental illness on the part 
of defense attorneys compromises their defense strategies. 
The adversarial system in which the opinion of one expert witness is pitted 
against another undoubtedly contributes to jurors’ perception that the presence 
or absence of mental illness in an individual is debatable.175  It appears that the 
 
 169. Id. at 885 n.4. 
 170. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116. 
 171. Miller, 373 So. 2d. at 885-86. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Berkman, supra note 167; Judson et al., supra note 167. 
 174. TEXAS APPLESEED & TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, MENTAL ILLNESS, 
YOUR CLIENT AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2d ed. 2004), available at http://www.hogg. 
utexas.edu/PDF/mental_illness.pdf. 
 175. See Jonas Robitscher & Andrew Ky Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 31 
EMORY L.J. 9, 43 (1982) (citing Should We Abolish the Insanity Defense? 6 MIND & MED. 1, 1 
(1979-1980)).  Most forensic evaluators agree on both diagnoses and legal opinions. Kenneth K. 
Funkunaga et al., Insanity Plea: Interexaminer Agreement and Concordance of Psychiatric 
Opinion and Court Verdict, 5 L. & HUM.  BEHAV. 325, 326 (1981); J. Robert Russell, Criminal 
Discovery and Psychological Defenses in West Virginia: “Squeezing a Lemon” or “Kicking a 
Dog,” 99 W. VA. L. REV. 207, 216 (1996) (citing Jeffrey Janofsky et al., Defendants Pleading 
Insanity: An Analysis of Outcome, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 203, 210 (1989)).  The 
perception of battling experts on the issue of mental illness and insanity appears to be an artifact 
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process of “death qualification” for sitting on a capital jury may significantly 
lessen a defendant’s chance to be found Not Guilty By Reason Of Insanity.176 
Guilty But Mentally Ill 
The Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI) verdict is worthy of mention because 
defendants found GBMI may still be put to death.177  GBMI statutes provide a 
good example of how bad law affecting the mentally ill is created in response 
to public outcry with little or no regard to existing scientific research.178  The 
first GBMI statute was enacted in Michigan in response to the Michigan 
Supreme Court’s ruling in People v. McQuillan.179  Prior to McQuillan, 
insanity acquitees were automatically committed to the Michigan Department 
of Mental Health for an indefinite period of time.180  In the McQuillen 
decision, the Michigan Supreme Court declared this practice unconstitutional 
because it violated due process and did not afford insanity acquitees equal 
protection, as insanity acquitees were not afforded the same procedures for 
obtaining release as patients civilly committed.181  As part of McQuillan, 270 
insanity acquitees were evaluated, and 214 were released, with 2 of the 
released acquitees committing highly publicized, heinous crimes within a year 
of their release.182  The Michigan GBMI statute was enacted a year later, and 
stated that a defendant could be found GBMI if the judge or jury found that the 
defendant was guilty of the offense, was mentally ill at the time of the offense, 
and lacked sufficient capacity either to appreciate the nature, quality, or 
wrongfulness of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
 
based on the fact that the vast majority of insanity pleas are settled out of court and agreed to by 
both the defense and prosecution. Funkungaga et al., supra, at 326; Russell, supra, at 216 (citing 
Janofsky et al., supra, at 210). 
 176. Phoebe C. Ellsworth et al., The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity, 8 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 81, 91-92 (1984). 
 177. See Lisa M. Sloat & Richard L. Frierson, Juror Knowledge and Attitudes Regarding 
Mental Illness Verdicts, 33 J. AM. ACAD.  PSYCHIATRY & L. 208, 212 (2005). 
 178. See Michelle R. Prejean, Comment, Texas Law Made This Mad Woman Sane, 42 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1487, 1493-95 (2006). 
 179. People v. McQuillan, 221 N.W.2d 569 (Mich. 1974); see also Andrew J. Black, People 
v. Lloyd: Michigan’s Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict Created with Intention to Help is Not Really 
a Benefit at All, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 75, 79 (2001). 
 180. McQuillan, 221 N.W.2d at 572. 
 181. Id. at 586. 
 182. Sloat & Frierson, supra note 177, at 208 (citing L. W. Blunt & H. V. Stock. Guilty But 
Mentally Ill: An Alternative Verdict, 3 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 49 (1985)); Lynn W. Blunt & Harley V. 
Stock, Guilty but Mentally Ill: An Alternative Verdict, 3 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 49, 51-52 (1985). 
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the law.183  Interestingly this is essentially the same criteria as the American 
Law Institute definition of legal insanity.184 
After John Hinkley, Jr. was found NGRI in the assassination attempt on 
President Reagan, there was a significant groundswell of public opinion 
against the insanity defense185 (despite its rarity both in terms of being raised 
as well as its success).186  Juries can find a defendant GBMI if they believe that 
a mental illness was present at the time of the offense, but was not of such an 
extent as to warrant an NGRI verdict.  GBMI verdicts became more popular 
after the Hinkley trial, as it was represented as a way to acknowledge the 
defendant’s mental illness, without finding him or her NGRI (which by 
definition exonerates the defendant from moral responsibility for his or her 
act(s)).187 
Guilty But Mental Ill verdicts appear to have roughly two meanings among 
the different states that have enacted it.188  The first meaning denotes an 
inability to control one’s actions.189  By definition, the GBMI verdict in South 
Carolina indicates that the defendant was acting under an irresistible impulse, 
and unable to conform his behavior to the law.190  However, despite the fact 
 
 183. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §468.36 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2006, No 1-59). 
 184. PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 
AND THE LAW 277-79 (1991).  See also BONNIE ET AL., supra note 163. 
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a 
result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law.  (2) As used in this Article, the terms “mental disease or defect” do not include an 
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct. 
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 189. Id. (citing and quoting S.C. CODE ANN. §17-24-20(A) (1992)). South Carolina’s statute 
states: “A defendant is guilty but mentally ill if, at the time of the commission of the act 
constituting the offense . . . because of mental disease or defect he lacked sufficient capacity to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” S.C. CODE ANN. §17-24-20(A). 
 190. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20(A). 
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that an individual unable to control his behavior is suffering from volitional 
impairment, a lack of voluntariness, the South Carolina Supreme Court does 
not acknowledge that the verdict of GBMI has any bearing on the defendant’s 
blameworthiness or culpability.  Defendants found GBMI in South Carolina 
can be put to death.191 
It is probable that the majority of jurors sitting in judgment of defendants 
for whom a verdict of GBMI is presented as a possible outcome do not fully 
understand its ramifications, including the fact that the death penalty is a 
potential dispositional outcome.192  GBMI verdicts may be incorrectly 
perceived as a compromise position between finding a defendant NGRI and a 
guilty verdict.193  GBMI verdicts do not guarantee prisoners adequate mental 
health treatment.  Georgia’s statute specifically states that prisoners who have 
been found GBMI receive treatment only as financial resources permit.194  In 
People v. Marshall, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that failing to provide 
psychiatric treatment for prisoners found GBMI did not render the statute 
unconstitutional. 195 
Some states have attached a different meaning to GBMI—that is mental 
illness where the impulse is less controlling.196  Once again, archaic 
terminology and language that has not kept pace with scientific advances in the 
understanding of mental illness shape legal arguments and rationales.  For 
example, proponents of preserving the possibility of the death penalty for 
defendants found GBMI note that such defendants have not been deprived of 
all their volitional capacity (again, a legal term and concept without a 
medical/psychiatric counterpart harkening back to at least the 18th century),197 
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 192. Sloat & Frierson, supra note 177, at 211-12.  In this study of ninety-six qualified and 
“highly educated” (eighty-five percent of high school graduates with a median income of $40,000 
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GBMI. Id. at 210-11.  Eighty-four percent of responders thought that juries should be informed of 
dispositional outcomes before deciding a verdict, and 68.4 percent of jurors mistakenly believed 
that a defendant found GBMI could not receive the death penalty. Id. at 212. 
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and that their culpability is not unlike defendants from poverty stricken and 
abusive backgrounds.198 
CONCLUSIONS 
We should clarify that our position is not that the severely mentally ill 
should be eligible for the death penalty.  We believe, however, that death 
penalty opposition in general exerts a strong pull to “make the shoe fit,” that is 
it attempts to broaden the net that could potentially exempt individuals facing 
potential execution with reasoning that is not medically and scientifically 
justified.  The exemption for mental illness should apply to Axis I disorders in 
which there is psychosis. 199  To narrow the requisite mental illness in this 
manner would preserve this exemption for the sickest of the sick—for those 
defendants and prisoners about whom there would be minimal debate 




 198. See Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 134 (Del. 1990) (“The fact that Standers might, in 
theory, have resisted his pathological impulses provides a justification for punishment.”). 
 199. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 74, at 27-28.  The DSM is a multiaxial system of assessment. 
Id. at 27.  Axis I is for reporting all mental disorders except for personality disorders and mental 
retardation which are recorded on Axis II. Id. at 28-29. 
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